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Children are in the vanguard of America’s increasing racial and ethnic diversity. The majority of newborn babies today are among 
racial and ethnic minority populations, according to 
recent Census Bureau estimates. U.S. Census Bureau 
projections indicate that by 2043, non-Hispanic 
whites will cease to be a majority of the American 
population. For America’s children and youth, 
the future is now.1 American diversity is fueled by 
differing fertility rates among racial and ethnic 
groups, changes in the racial composition of women 
of childbearing age, and immigration. Here we 
document how unfolding demographic forces have 
placed today’s children and youth at the forefront of 
America’s new racial and ethnic diversity. America’s 
rapidly changing racial and ethnic composition has 
important implications for intergroup relations, eth-
nic identities, and electoral politics.2 
 Much of the growing racial diversity is caused by 
unprecedented population increases of minority chil-
dren, particularly Hispanic children. It is also due to a 
significant numerical decline in the number of non-
Hispanic white children, which is less often appreciated. 
The Great Recession reduced fertility and domestic 
migration rates and slowed the flow of immigrants, yet 
the demographic forces fueling diversity are unrelent-
ing. Diversity has unfolded unevenly in geographic 
space. More than 600 U.S. counties, or approximately 
one-fifth of U.S. counties, had “majority-minority” 
youth populations in 2012—a number considerably 
higher than for the U.S. population overall. The fre-
quent claim that we live in an increasingly multiracial 
or multicultural society does not necessarily mean 
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that national patterns have played out at the local or 
regional level. Racial diversity is spreading unevenly 
from state to state, community to community, and 
neighborhood to neighborhood. 
Increasing Racial and 
Ethnic Diversity Among 
America’s Children
Approximately 37 percent of the 
U.S. population was a racial or 
ethnic minority in 2012. The pace 
of this change has been particularly 
rapid among America’s children 
and youth. In 1990, 32 percent of 
the population younger than age 
20 was minority, increasing to 39 
percent in 2000. By July of 2012, 47 
percent of the 82.5 million people 
under age 20 in America were from 
minority populations (Figure 1). 
In contrast, minorities represented 
only 33 percent of the 231.4 million 
residents age 20 or older. Within 
this older population, Hispanics 
(14 percent) constituted a slightly 
larger share of the population than 
blacks (12 percent). However, 
among those under age 20, 
Hispanics constituted 24 percent 
and blacks constituted 14 percent.
The acceleration of racial and 
ethnic diversity is evidenced further 
when we compare preschool-age 
children with older teenagers. 
Minorities represented 48 percent 
of the population under age 5 in 
2012 but only 43 percent among 
15- to 19-year-olds. This age gra-
dient of minority representation 
clearly highlights America’s new and 
increasing diversity.
The growth of America’s minor-
ity population, coupled with recent 
population declines of non-Hispanic 
white children, fuel the growing 
youth diversity in the United States. 
Between 2000 and 2012, the number 
of minority young people grew by 7.7 
million (25 percent). The Hispanic 
youth population accounted for 5.8 
million, or approximately 75 percent 
of the increase in the U.S. minority 
population under age 20, after 
increasing by 42 percent between 
2000 and 2012 (Figure 2). This 
recent gain supplements substantial 
Hispanic population gains during the 
1990s. The number of people under 
20 in the “other” minority group (pri-
marily Asian and multiracial) grew by 
2.3 million (42 percent) between 2000 
and 2012. In contrast, the young black 
population declined (-2.8 percent) 
during the same period. The popula-
tion decline of young blacks—histori-
cally the largest minority group in the 
country—underscores the fundamen-
tal demographic changes underway in 
America’s minority population.
The rapid growth of the minority 
youth population contrasts sharply 
with patterns among young whites. 
The number of young whites 
increased by only 54,000 (1 per-
cent) during the 1990s. However, 
since 2000, the number of young 
non-Hispanic whites has declined 
by 5.7 million (-11.5 percent). As 
FIGURE 1. ADULT AND YOUTH POPULATION BY RACE/HISPANIC ORIGIN, 2012
a result, the proportion of young 
people who are non-Hispanic white 
declined from 61 to 53 percent 
between 2000 and 2012. 
Minority Births Increase, 
White Births Diminish
Fertility has played an important 
role in the shifting patterns of racial 
diversity. In 1990, non-Hispanic 
whites accounted for nearly two-
thirds of all births. Blacks accounted 
for the second largest number of 
births (17 percent), followed by 
Hispanics (15 percent). By 2012, U.S. 
births decreased by 5 percent com-
pared with 1990, but Hispanic births 
had risen by more than 50 percent. 
Births to non-Hispanic whites and 
blacks diminished during the same 
period. By 2012, non-Hispanic white 
births represented slightly less than 
half of all births according to Census 
Bureau estimates, while Hispanic 
births grew to 26 percent of all births. 
Source: U.S. Census Population Estimates (2012)
Notes: Adults are age 20 and over, and youth are under age 20. Hispanic category includes Hispanics of any race.  
Other category includes native peoples and those of two or more races. 
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than their counterparts, although 
their total fertility rate declined 
significantly from nearly 3 children in 
1990 to roughly 2.2 children in 2012 
(Figure 4). Early childbearing also 
characterizes the Hispanic popula-
tion; 44 percent of all Hispanic new-
borns had mothers younger than age 
25. In contrast, non-Hispanic white 
women delayed childbearing and had 
lower fertility rates; approximately 30 
percent of white babies were born to 
mothers younger than age 25. 
Black women also have children 
at a younger age than the U.S. aver-
age, but declining black fertility has 
diminished the young black popu-
lation. The groups that constitute 
most “other” minorities (Asians and 
multiracial groups) also had low 
total fertility rates, so population 
gains were primarily attributable 
to the rising numbers of women 
of childbearing age in this group 
rather than to high fertility rates. 
Clearly, below-replacement fertil-
ity among non-Hispanic whites 
intensifies the demographic effect 
of increasing numbers of minority 
women with high fertility rates on 
America’s racial and ethnic diversity.
The Great Recession has had a 
significant impact on U.S. fertility. 
Overall, births dropped from 4.3 
million in 2007 to slightly less than 
4 million in 2012—a decline of 8.4 
percent. Furthermore, the latest 
data do not suggest a recovery in 
African-America births remained 
stable at 15 percent of the total.   
Differences with regard to race 
and Hispanic origin among women 
in their prime childbearing years 
(ages 20 to 39) contributed signifi-
cantly to America’s changing racial 
and ethnic mix. During the 1990s, 
the number of non-Hispanic white 
women of prime childbearing age 
declined by nearly 4 million (-12.8 
percent) and declined by another 
2.4 million between 2000 and 2012 
(Figure 3). In contrast, the num-
ber of minority women of prime 
childbearing age grew by 2.8 mil-
lion (25 percent) in the 1990s and 
by 3.8 million (25 percent) between 
2000 and 2012. Hispanic women 
accounted for slightly more than 61 
percent of this absolute minority 
gain. The number of other minority 
women in their prime childbearing 
years also increased significantly, 
although population gains among 
black women were minimal.
The cumulative effect of these 
changes in the number of women 
of prime childbearing age has been 
considerable. By 2012, there were 
6.2 million (-21 percent) fewer non-
Hispanic white women of prime 
childbearing age than there were in 
1990. In contrast, 6.6 million (58 
percent) more minority women 
were in their prime childbearing 
years. As a result, the proportion of 
all women in their prime childbear-
ing years who were non-Hispanic 
white decreased from 73 percent to 
57 percent between 1990 and 2012. 
High Hispanic fertility rates, along 
with early childbearing, combined 
with increasing numbers of Hispanic 
women to produce large increases 
in births to Hispanic mothers in the 
past two decades. Hispanic women 
continue to have higher fertility rates 
FIGURE 2. ANNUALIZED POPULATION CHANGE FOR THOSE UNDER AGE 20 
BY RACE/HISPANIC ORIGIN, FROM 1990 TO 2000 AND FROM 2000 TO 2012
Source: Decennial Census 1990 and 2000; U.S. Census Population Estimates (2012)
The Great Recession has had 
a significant impact on U.S. 
fertility. Overall, births dropped 
from 4.3 million in 2007 to 
slightly less than 4 million in 
2012—a decline of 8.4 percent. 
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fertility rates. Fewer births have 
implications for the diversity of the 
child population because reces-
sionary declines in fertility rates 
have been uneven among racial 
and ethnic populations. Fertility 
rate declines were much higher 
for women in their 20s than for 
women in their 30s. Between 
2007 and 2012, the fertility rate 
of women in their 20s dropped 
by 15.3 percent compared with a 
gain of 0.8 percent for women in 
their 30s. Many younger women 
appear to be delaying childbear-
ing, although older women who are 
more financially secure and facing 
limited fertility horizons are not. 
 Hispanic women in their 20s 
experienced the largest fertility 
rate decline between 2007 and 
2012 (Figure 5). Fertility rates for 
young women declined in other 
racial groups as well, but the 
declines were more modest. These 
changing patterns of fertility have 
implications for the diversity of 
young children. Because of the 
precipitous decline in Hispanic 
fertility rates, Hispanic births 
declined between 2007 and 2012 
despite an increase of nearly 16 
percent in the number of Hispanic 
women of prime childbearing age. 
Non-Hispanic white and black 
births also dropped because of 
lower fertility rates and fewer 
women of childbearing age. 
Hispanic Population Gains 
Stimulate Population 
Growth of Minority Youth
From a demographic stand-
point, Hispanics are driving 
rapid increases in racial diversity 
among America’s children. In fact, 
FIGURE 3. ANNUALIZED POPULATION CHANGE OF WOMEN AGED 20–39, 
FROM 1990 TO 2000 AND FROM 2000 TO 2012
Source: Decennial Census 1990 and 2000; U.S. Census Population Estimates (2012)
FIGURE 4. TOTAL FERTILITY RATE BY RACE AND HISPANIC ORIGIN, 1990, 
2000, 2007, AND 2012
Source: NCHS 1990 to 2012
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gain between 2000 and 2012, 
although they represented only 
16.9 percent of the population. 
An increasing share of minority 
children are U.S. born rather than 
foreign born. Minority children— 
particularly Hispanics and 
Asians—are the new second 
generation (that is, native-born of 
foreign-born parents). U.S.‒born 
children accounted for at least 
95 percent of all children under 
the age of 5 for each of the major 
minority groups considered here in 
2012. A substantial share of native-
born minorities was born to for-
eign-born parents, some of whom 
are undocumented immigrants, 
raising new policy concerns about 
so-called anchor babies—children 
who are U.S. citizens but whose 
parents are undocumented—
although the empirical evidence is 
limited. In 2008, only 39 percent of 
0- to 4-year-old Hispanic children 
had two native-born parents. At 
that time, an additional 17 percent 
had one native-born parent and the 
remaining 44 percent had two for-
eign-born parents. In 2008, the Pew 
Research Center estimated that 40 
percent of native-born Hispanics 
under age 18 with at least one 
foreign-born parent had at least 
one unauthorized parent. However, 
the oldest U.S.‒born children of 
the Hispanic immigrant streams 
arriving in large numbers in the 
1980s and 1990s are now having 
children of their own. As a result, 
the percentage of Hispanic children 
with U.S.‒born parents is expected 
to grow in the near future. In fact, 
the Pew Research Center estimates 
that the share of Hispanic youth 
who are the children of immigrants 
will soon peak.3 
FIGURE 5. FERTILITY RATE FOR WOMEN AGE 20–29 AND 30–39 BY RACE/
HISPANIC ORIGIN, 2007 AND 2012
Source: NCHS 2007 and 2012
75 percent of the growth in the 
minority child population between 
2000 and 2012 was attributable to 
Hispanic births. The initial rea-
son for recent population gains in 
Hispanic children has been immi-
gration. Between 2000 and 2012, 
5.6 million Hispanics immigrated 
to the United States, supplementing 
the 7.7 million who arrived during 
the 1990s. Most new immigrants 
are young adults of prime child-
bearing age. This influx, coupled 
with the large Hispanic population 
of childbearing age already in the 
United States, produced the surge 
in Hispanic births. 
Indeed, three-fourths of the 
entire Hispanic population gain 
between July of 2011 and July of 
2012 came from natural increase—
the difference between births and 
deaths—rather than immigration. 
Furthermore, this percentage is 
increasing. Hispanics are also 
younger, which influences mor-
tality as well as fertility. In 2012, 
there were 6.7 births for every 
Hispanic death; in contrast, the 
ratio was 1.0 and 2.4 births for 
every death among non-Hispanic 
whites and blacks, respectively. 
This high birth-to-death ratio is 
responsible for increasing num-
bers and shares of Hispanics. 
Indeed, Hispanics accounted for 
54.5 percent of the U.S. population 
Three-fourths of the entire 
Hispanic population gain 
between July of 2011 and July 
of 2012 came from natural 
increase—the difference 
between births and deaths—
rather than immigration. 
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Minority Youth 
Populations Increasing 
Fastest Outside Large 
Urban Cores 
The conventional wisdom is that 
increasing diversity is primarily a 
big-city phenomenon. However, the 
evidence suggests otherwise; the 
new growth of minority children 
is spatially broad-based. In fact, 
the largest absolute and percent-
age gains are outside the urban 
core counties of metropolitan areas 
with more than 1 million residents 
(Figure 6). Indeed, the suburban 
and smaller metropolitan coun-
ties, in which minority population 
gains are now most heavily con-
centrated, are home to 45.1 million 
(55 percent) of the nation’s 82.5 
million young people. A significant 
majority are non-Hispanic white 
(59 percent), despite a decline of 
of metropolitan children (51 percent). 
In fact, rural areas had 837,000 fewer 
young people in 2012 than in 2000, 
because there were 1.4 million (-12.9 
percent) fewer non-Hispanic white 
youths. Declines in the young black 
population were nearly proportionally 
equal to decline in the young white 
population (-12.4 percent). The large 
population gains in Hispanic young 
people (48.2 percent) were insufficient 
to fully offset losses of blacks and 
non-Hispanic whites. As a result, the 
rural youth population declined by 
6.1 percent after 2000. 
National trends mask substantial 
geographic variation in America’s 
racial and ethnic makeup. The 
majority of the young population 
in 606 counties is now composed of 
minorities (that is, majority-minority 
counties), and another 306 counties 
are near majority-minority status, 
with between 40 and 50 percent 
minority youth populations (Figure 
7). Young people clearly are a har-
binger of future racial change and 
diversity in America, particularly as 
deaths among the older, primarily 
white population are disproportion-
ately replaced by minority births. In 
2012, substantially more counties 
had majority-minority youth popula-
tions than counties that had major-
ity-minority populations spanning 
all age groups (606 versus 353).
Most majority-minority coun-
ties are concentrated in traditional 
minority settlement areas. For 
example, large minority youth 
population clusters, particularly in 
the Southwest and the Mississippi 
Delta, are a continuing legacy of 
America’s past (for example, slavery 
in the South). New concentrations 
of majority-minority counties in 
the Carolinas and Georgia, in the 
Pacific Northwest, and in Colorado 
2.6 million (-9.1 percent) since 
2000. In contrast, minority children 
and youth populations, regardless 
of racial and ethnic background, 
grew rapidly outside the largest 
metropolitan cores. The number of 
Hispanic youth, for example, has 
swelled by 3.4 million (58.7 percent) 
since 2000; this is the largest gain of 
any minority population in any area 
during this period. 
In large urban cores, where 
minority populations have tradi-
tionally clustered, 66 percent of the 
24.5 million children and youth are 
minorities. The population of minor-
ity children has grown by more than 
1.8 million in these areas since 2000. 
Population declines among blacks 
and whites have been offset by this 
large Hispanic population gain. 
Minority children constitute a con-
siderably smaller share of all nonmet-
ropolitan children (29 percent) than 
FIGURE 6. POPULATION CHANGE FOR THOSE UNDER AGE 20 BY RACE/HISPANIC 
ORIGIN AND METROPOLITAN STATUS, FROM 2000 TO 2012
Source: U.S. Decennial Census 2000; U.S. Census Population Estimates (2012)
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also reflect the geographic spread 
of minority children and youth, 
particularly Hispanics.
Even in regions in which minori-
ties are not approaching majority 
status, diversity is rapidly acceler-
ating. To illustrate this trend, we 
calculated a diversity index, which 
indicates the probability that two 
randomly selected young people 
in a county will be of a different 
race or ethnicity. For example, a 
diversity index of 0.50 means that 
a young person residing in that 
county has approximately a 50 per-
cent chance of random exposure to 
a young county resident who is of a 
different race or ethnicity.
Nearly all of the Southeast and 
Southwest have at least moder-
ate levels of diversity, and that 
diversity extends to the sprawl-
ing metropolitan regions of the 
Midwest and East (Figure 8). 
However, large areas of the coun-
try reveal comparatively limited 
racial and ethnic diversity, includ-
ing the vast agriculture heartland 
in the upper Midwest with the 
exception of scattered counties 
in the Great Plains (for example, 
Native American Reservations and 
new Hispanic destinations with 
food processing plants). Diversity 
is also modest in the Northeast 
in areas outside the coastal urban 
agglomeration. 
The combination of specific 
minority groups creating or 
FIGURE 7. CONCENTRATION OF MINORITY POPULATION UNDER AGE 20, 2012
Source: U.S. Census Population Estimates (2012)
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limiting diversity varies by place 
(Figure 9). Here, a spatial repre-
sentation of minority youth con-
centrations reflects the number of 
minority groups that represented 
more than 10 percent of the youth 
population in a given county. The 
map reflects both the vestiges of 
historical minority settlement pat-
terns and the influence of con-
temporary demographic trends. 
The large county clusters with 
significant black youth minorities 
in the South reflect histori-
cal black settlement patterns in 
the antebellum South. The new 
spatial distribution of Hispanics 
in the Southwest reflects histori-
cal patterns of border settlement, 
contemporary migration, and 
natural population increase. The 
scattered clusters of native peoples 
also illustrate a legacy of tradi-
tional settlement patterns and 
forced resettlement. However, for 
nearly one-half of all counties, 
no minority groups reached 10 
percent of the population, under-
scoring a simple but straightfor-
ward demographic point: National 
data are often used to suggest the 
rapid spread of diversity, glossing 
over large disparities in the spatial 
distribution of minority youth. 
In 2012, only 322 counties 
had two youth minority groups 
that each represented 10 percent 
of the overall county popula-
tion. Nevertheless, the effect of 
Source: U.S. Decennial Census 2000; U.S. Census Population Estimates (2012)
FIGURE 8. RACIAL DIVERSITY OF POPULATION UNDER AGE 20, 2012
Source: U.S. Census Population Estimates (2012)
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FIGURE 9. DISTRIBUTION OF MINORITY POPULATION UNDER AGE 20, 2012
Source: U.S. Census Population Estimates (2012)
contemporary trends was most 
evident in these counties. In North 
Carolina, where blacks were once 
the only visible minority popula-
tion, diversity is now redefined by 
the recent arrival of Hispanics.4 
The scattered Hispanic population 
clusters in traditional agricultural 
areas of the Great Plains and Corn 
Belt also reflect contemporary 
demographic trends. Here the 
demand for agricultural-related 
labor, such as meatpacking and 
irrigated agriculture, exceeded 
the local labor force depleted by 
decades of white out-migration 
and low fertility. The influx of 
young Hispanic families has 
important demographic conse-
quences as well. Minority in-
migration may break the cycle 
of natural population decrease 
caused by persistent out-migration 
and low fertility of natives. 
In the Washington, DC met-
ropolitan area, the historical 
concentration of blacks, com-
bined with recent in-migration 
of Hispanics and Asians, have 
produced one of America’s most 
diverse populations of children 
and youth. Such broadly diverse 
counties remain rare, however, 
even when our demographic lens 
focuses on young people. Only 24 
of the 3,141 U.S. counties con-
tained three or more identifiable 
minority youth populations (of 10 
percent or more) in 2012. 
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Conclusion
Issues of race and racial inclusion 
continue to occupy much of public 
discourse in America. The influx of 
nearly 1 million immigrants annu-
ally—primarily from Latin America 
and Asia—has further fueled debates 
about multiculturalism and social, 
economic, and cultural fragmenta-
tion (for example, English language 
use, increasing multiracial intermar-
riage, increasing multiracial popula-
tions, and political and economic 
power). The Census Bureau’s recent 
projection of a majority-minority U.S. 
population by the middle of the cen-
tury has sometimes been the source 
of alarmist rhetoric about the role 
of immigration in America’s future 
and the nation’s essential character. 
We argue here that racial and ethnic 
multiculturalism are also driven by 
recent fertility patterns in the United 
States, revealed in the rapidly increas-
ing racial and ethnic diversity among 
America’s children and youth.   
Our research highlights the two 
demographic forces that have placed 
today’s young people in the fore-
front of America’s new racial and 
ethnic diversity. The first is the rapid 
increase in the number of minority 
youths, with Hispanics accounting 
for the vast majority of population 
gains since 2000. A second but less 
widely recognized shift is the abso-
lute decline of non-Hispanic white 
young people. Together, these two 
trends have resulted in increasing 
proportions of minority children 
and youth. America is becoming a 
majority-minority society—with 
children leading the way. 
The Great Recession and its 
aftermath have slowed the growth of 
the U.S. population. Had the reces-
sion not occurred and the fertility 
trends of 2007 been sustained, we 
estimate there would have been 1.3 
million additional births between 
2007 and 2012. Furthermore, if past 
fertility trends persisted, more than 
one-half of all these foregone births 
would likely have been minority. 
Key questions are as follows: Are 
these foregone births lost forever or 
simply delayed, to be made up as 
the economy recovers? If they are 
delayed births, how quickly will they 
come and will the rate of increase 
be consistent for all racial/Hispanic 
groups? As is evident from our 
previous analysis, disproportionate 
shares of the foregone births were 
to Hispanic mothers. If Hispanic 
women now have children who were 
delayed during the recession, youth 
diversity will accelerate quicker. 
An additional question concerns 
the timing of the births that did 
not occur because of the recession. 
If the “catch-up” in births occurs 
simultaneously with higher fertility 
rates typical of economic recovery 
and growth, the result will be a 
significant surge in births and larger 
cohorts of young children. However, 
although the pace and pattern of 
fertility change resulting from the 
recession has short-term implica-
tions, powerful demographic forces 
guarantee that America’s children 
and youth will lead the nation’s 
increasing diversity.
Our results also highlight the 
increasing racial divide along the 
dimensions of age and geogra-
phy. Approximately 47 percent 
of the youth population in 2012 
were minority, compared with 36 
percent of the 40- to 45-year-olds 
and less than 21 percent of those 
65 and older (Figure 10), raising 
important questions about inter-
generational support for social 
FIGURE 10. PERCENT OF YOUNG, WORKING AGE, AND SENIOR POPULATION THAT 
IS NON-HISPANIC WHITE AND MINORITY, 2012, 2030, AND 2050 PROJECTIONS
Source: U.S. Census Estimates and Projections
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programs.5 For example, will 
America’s older, primarily white 
population—through the ballot 
box and collective self-interest—
support young people who are 
now much different racially and 
perhaps culturally from them-
selves and their own children? 
Will the older, white population 
vote to raise taxes to assist schools 
that serve young people who differ 
from them ethnically or racially? 
Some evidence suggests that the 
presence of large fractions of 
elderly residents in a jurisdiction 
is associated with significantly 
less spending per-child for edu-
cation, particularly if the elderly 
and children are disproportion-
ately represented across racial 
and ethnic groups.6 On the other 
hand, it is likely that increasing 
shares of America’s seniors will 
have children and grandchildren 
who are in or result from inter-
racial marriages, a fact that binds 
generations rather than separates 
them. Conversely, as the minority 
population ages and constitutes a 
larger proportion of the working- 
and voting-age population, will 
they be supportive of expanding 
entitlement programs for older 
adults who will still be primarily 
non-Hispanic white?
Our finding of greater diver-
sity among the nation’s youngest 
residents also offers grounds for 
optimism. The multiracial and 
multiethnic character of com-
munities in which children are 
raised influence race relations and 
cultural boundaries, both now and 
in the future. Diverse communi-
ties provide better opportunities 
for mutual understanding and 
acceptance. For America’s young 
people, increasing exposure to 
racial diversity will remake pat-
terns of multiracial relations and 
friendship networks. Attitude sur-
veys show that young people are 
much more racially tolerant than 
older people and that prejudice 
has declined as the older genera-
tion fades from the scene to be 
replaced by the next generation.7 
Optimism about improved rela-
tions among young people of diverse 
backgrounds must be tempered by 
spatial disparities in racial compo-
sition and diversity. The increas-
ing racial and ethnic diversity of 
America’s youth is no longer limited 
to the large multiracial urban cores or 
to regions where minorities histori-
cally settled. Instead, the post-2000 
period ushered in a new pattern of 
accelerated dispersion among minor-
ity children and youth. Yet, broad 
geographic regions still provide few 
significant opportunities for daily 
interaction between young people 
with different racial and cultural 
backgrounds. Furthermore, evidence 
of increasing racial diversity among 
youth at the county level does not 
demonstrate that diversity exists 
across communities or neighbor-
hoods.8 The geographic landscape 
of race currently suggests two 
Americas—an increasingly racially 
diverse nation versus a primarily 
white nation. Opportunities for racial 
and ethnic interaction, and opportu-
nities for mutual understanding and 
acceptance, vary by place.
Our research contributes to 
policy discussions by highlight-
ing the new diversity among 
America’s youth and the changing 
geographic scale of the expression 
of this diversity. Our research also 
provides a window to America’s 
future.9 As we demonstrate here, 
the changing racial and ethnic 
composition of America’s youngest 
populations can be traced to two 
forces: differential changes in the 
numbers of women of childbearing 
age by race and Hispanic origin, 
and differential rates of fertility, 
particularly higher fertility among 
Hispanics, which is a by-product 
of recent immigration trends. In a 
policy environment usually focused 
on immigration, recognizing the 
rising importance of other demo-
graphic factors is no small achieve-
ment. With or without restrictive 
immigration legislation, America is 
becoming an increasingly diverse 
society though this diversity is 
experienced unevenly spatially.  
Natural population increase—
particularly fertility rates—will 
continue to reshape the racial and 
ethnic mix of the country, and this 
change will be reflected first among 
the nation’s youngest residents.
Methodology
We used multiple sources of data for 
our analyses. The primary sources of 
contemporary data are the Decennial 
Census of 2010 and Census Bureau 
annual estimates of the popula-
tion by age, sex, race, and Hispanic 
origin from April of 2010 to July of 
2012, released in May of 2013.10 We 
also used Census Bureau estimates 
of births and deaths by race and 
Hispanic origin. We supplemented 
America is becoming a majority-
minority society—with children 
leading the way. 
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these sources with historical data 
from the 1990 and 2000 Census that 
has been adjusted for under enu-
meration by age, race, and Hispanic 
origin. Furthermore, respondents 
who classified themselves as multira-
cial in 2000 were allocated to racial 
categories to make them compatible 
with the 1990 census data.11 We also 
used birth data from the National 
Center for Health Statistics to exam-
ine fertility rates and trends.12
Understanding America’s chang-
ing racial and ethnic composition is a 
challenging endeavor, partly because 
measurement is typically based on 
self-identification or self-reporting. 
Racial and ethnic self-identification is 
also highly subjective, situational, and 
fluid. We cannot adjudicate current 
debates about proper racial and ethnic 
classification using the secondary data 
at our disposal. We therefore advise a 
cautious approach to the evidence and 
recognition of the inherent subjective 
nature of our demographic exercise. 
For most purposes, we clas-
sified the population into four 
groups: (1) Hispanics of any race, 
(2) non-Hispanic whites, (3) non-
Hispanic blacks, and (4) all other 
non-Hispanics, including those 
who reported two or more races. 
Asians were the largest racial group 
included in this fourth category, 
constituting 51 percent of those 
under age 19 in the category. Also 
included in this category are native 
peoples and those of two or more 
races. We also grouped the popula-
tion into two age groups: Persons 
age 19 or younger were classified as 
“young,” or the youth population. 
Individuals older than age 19 were 
grouped together into an “adult” 
category, which we occasionally 
refer to as the older population. 
To examine the uneven spatial 
distribution of different racial and 
ethnic populations, we calculated 
summary measures of diversity. 
First, we estimated the number and 
percentage of majority-minority 
counties—those with at least one-
half the young population com-
posed of minority groups—and 
near majority-minority counties—
those with minorities constituting 
between 40 and 50 percent of the 
population. Counties were also 
classified as having minority youth 
concentrations if more than 10 
percent of the young population 
was from a specific minority group. 
Four minority groups that reached 
the 10 percent threshold in at least 
one county were as follows: blacks, 
Hispanics, Asians, and Native 
Americans. Counties that had two 
or more minority groups each 
reaching the 10 percent threshold 
were classified as multiethnic.
We also calculated a diversity 
index (DI), the so-called Simpson 
Index, which measures the racial 
and ethnic diversity of the popula-
tion.13 It was calculated as follows:
DI = 1 - (H2 + W2 + B2 + A2 + N2 
+ M2)
where H is the Hispanic propor-
tion, W is the non-Hispanic white 
proportion, B is the non-Hispanic 
black proportion, A is the non-
Hispanic Asian proportion, N is 
the non-Hispanic native peoples 
proportion, and M is the non-His-
panic multiracial proportion (that 
is, those constituting two or more 
races). The values of DI range from 
0, which indicates that a county is 
made up entirely of one race/eth-
nicity, to a maximum value of 0.83, 
which means that each race/ethnic-
ity constitutes exactly one-sixth of 
the population. DI has a straightfor-
ward and intuitive interpretation. 
It measures the probability that any 
two children, picked at random in a 
county, would be of a different race 
or ethnicity (for example, Hispanic 
or non-Hispanic). 
Our analysis included all 3,143 
U.S. counties. We used county 
equivalents in the New England 
states, and we classified counties as 
metro or nonmetro using the 2003 
definition created by the Office of 
Management and Budget. Metro 
areas included counties contain-
ing an urban core (or central city) 
population of 50,000 or more 
along with adjacent counties that 
are highly integrated with the core 
county, as measured by commut-
ing patterns. There are 1,090 metro 
counties in the United States. We 
classified the remaining 2,053 
counties as nonmetro. For ease 
of exposition, we used the terms 
metro and urban (and nonmetro 
and rural) interchangeably. We 
identified large metro core counties 
as those counties containing the 
central city of metropolitan areas of 
1 million people or more, and we 
considered them separately from 
all other metropolitan counties. 
This was an important distinction, 
because metro counties with large 
urban cores historically have had 
large concentrations of minorities.
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